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Estache and Zheng  make  a case for federal  They rely for their analysis  on numce wal
monitoring of state environmental agencies'  policy simulations based on an analytical frame-
(SEPAs') performance - because of the tradeoff  work designed as a multilevel Stackelberg game.
for the states between the need to raise revenue  This framework reproduces the hierarchical
from taxes on local output and the need to limit  structure of pollution control policies in Brazil,
pollution.  where the federal environmental protection
agency relies on SEPAs to ensure that federally
They also show that fines and taxes assigned  defined minimum ambient standards are met
respectively to the federal and state governments  locally.
can improve firms' compliance and SEPA's
performance - and hence environmental quality  The numerical simulations are based on a
-without  damaging state revenue, and perhaps  case study of the food and the printing and
even improving it.  publishing industries.
ThePolicy Research Working PaperSeries disseminates the findings of workunder way in theBank. Anohiectiveofthe  series
is to get these findings out quickly, even if presentations are less than fully polished. The findings,  terpretations, and
conclusions in these papers do not necessarily represent official Bank policy.
Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination CenterTable  of.Content*
l.  Introduction ......... #  ........................ e  v§*evo  v¢o*  1
2.  A Game-Theoretical  Framework  to  Assess  Decentralized  Environmental
Policy-making  ... 0  .. 0...000........0.....  3
2.1 Motivating the Choice of the Analytical Framework  ..............  3
2.2  An Overview  of the  Model  and  of its  Theoretical
Policy Implications  ..** .......................................  4
i.  The firm's perspective  .....  ....  ..  ...............  S
ii.  The SEPA's perspective  ....  .......................  8
iii. The FEPA's perspective  .......  .......  . . ................  10
3.  Numerical Policy Simulations for  Brazil  ........................ 1....  l
3.1  Comparing  Optimal  Policies  for "Dirty"  and
"Clean"  Industries  ....  . ...........................................  13
3.2  Implications  of Reforms  for  the Printing  and
Publishing Sector  ..  .*.......................  17:
3.2.1  Which  Government  Level  Should  Try
to Improve Abatement Efficiency?  .........................  17
3.2.2  Do States  React  to Changes
in Federal Fines?  . ........  ......  ........ ...........  ..  18
3.2.3  Why  do Pollution  Taxes  Matter  So Much
to All Levels of Government  ....  ..............  . ......  21
4. Policy Lessons for Brazil  ....  O#** ................ *...........  26
ANNEX:  An  Analytical  Presentation  of  the  Model .......  O**..*  ...............  29
APPENDIXt  Data  Issues  ...  .....................................  44
*  The authors  wish to thank  Gunnar  Eskeland,  James Falk, Asif Faiz, Anthony
Fiacco,  Cheikh  Kane,  Billy  Jack,  Sudhir  Shetty  and Vinaya  Swaroop  for  their helpful
suggestions  and  discussions.  Salahuddin  Ahmad  provided  competent  research  assistance.1.  Introduction
Pollution  control  is highly  decentralized  in  Brazil.  state  governments  are
e~xpected  to ensure  that local  water and air quality  meet federal  minimum ambient
standards. This decentralization aims at greater autonomy  in the  implementation of
federal guidelines. States can then select and design instruments, within boundaries
defined  by the Constitution,  to achieve federal  objectives.  Most states rely on
regulations  such as  licenses or  standards  to  achieve  their  objectives.  Fines  on
polluters are used commonly by the states but  are generally not  directly related to the
level  of pollution.  In practice,  the success  of current  policies  has  been limited  as
in most of Brazil, pollution is increasing. I
Differences in  decentralized implementation  of federal  requirements across  states
may  reflect  differences  in  administrative  or financial  resources  available  to  monitor
polluters.  Weak  implamentation  may  result  from  weak  effective  commitment  to  the
pollution  issue  by  the  state  or  federal  governments.  States  may  have  multiple
objectives  and their  role as an agent  of the federal  government  may be only one of
those  objectives. Other goals  may include fiscal  revenue targets or local jobs creation
for.  instance.  Strong enforcement leads to lower  output and hence reduces tax revenue,
at least  in  the  short  run,  by reducing  the  tax  base  and  cutting  jobs. Davis  and  Lester
(1989)  and  Taylor (1990)  provide surveys, respectively  of the political science and  the
economic literature, analyzing evidence for the U.S. on the importance of  interstate
competition  for investment  or tax revenue  based on the degree of enforcement  of
pollution laws. They show competition is not widespread but that when it occurs, its
impact on resource allocation and mobilization is such that it cannot be ignored.
since  the  Brazilian  experience  of the  eighties  provides  ample  evidence  of tax
competition among states to attract jobs and investment across states, the interstate
regulatory competition issue in Brazil deserves particular attention. In fact, as in
many  other  decentralized  economies,  many  in  Brazilian  states  administrations  would  be
willing to argue that they face a tradeoff between revenue and environmental quality.
The underlying reasoning is as follows. The better a state's enforcement of federal
requirements,  the  less  polluted  the state  is but  the lower  is state  net  revenue.  Net
revenue is lower because output is cut, at least in the short run as capital has to be
diverted from production to pollution control. 2  But net revenue is also lower because
monitoring  is  costly  and  currently  only  yields  trivial  penalty  returns. This sort  of
reasoning  may  explain  why  the  degree  of  enforcement  of  pollution  laws  is  often
1.  Foran  t  erviewofissuesraisedbypollutioncontrolpoliciesinBazil,  seestache(1990).
2.  Since  thenmodel  focunseon  the  sitort  rmnany  output  effect  of technological  improvementsbrought  about by investment in pollution control
is suted  out.2
negotiated between polluter and state environmental agencies and may be one of the
sources of deterioration of Brazil's environment. 3
The paler  presents  some  reforms in the design of this decentralized pollution
control management that could result both in improvements in pollution control and in
state  revenue. It  shows how federal inspection  of the states' environmental protect'on
agency  (SEPAs) performance  could reduce the  incentive  for states to minimize  the
importance  of pollution control. If  SEPAs' poor monitoring allows the firms to pollute
more, the  SEPAs  should  be  penalized  by  the  federal government or its representative,
the federal environmental protection agency  (FEPA). The  penalty could be a fine or
could be a reduction in federal transfers.  Another reform that  should  be  considered
is  the introduction of a  pollution tax to  be collected by the states. The  tax would not
only increase the incentive of firms to comply with environmental regulation but also
that of the states as pollution revenu3 would offset the loss from production taxes.
This interpretation of the interactions among agents is essentially impossible
to test econometrically as data on the actual behavior of regulated firms, states or
federal  government  in  Brazil,  as  in most  countries,  are  scarce.  However,  these
strategic  interactions  can be  illustrated  and analyzed within  a  game-theoretical
framework. It identifies circumstances under which the federal government can induce
the firms  and the states to comply  with its  requirements. A priori, these circumstances
. vary from sector to sector with factors such as pollution intensity of the production
activity and the effectiveness of the abatement technology used by  the firms. But  there
are additional  factors that  contribute to the  success of decentralized  pollution
management. These  are illustrated by  some simulations discussed  in the paper. For
instance, since  federal monitoring is  not costless either, the federal government has
to carefully assess circumstances  under which it wishes to inspect the states. Firms
know it and are likely to adapt their compliance efforts to the likelihood of being
- audited and  to the federal  monitoring efforts. Since  the federal and states  governments
are aware of the firms' behavior, they adjust their policies to the firms' reactions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the choice of
the analytical  framework  reproducing the strategic  interactions between the  three
levels of decisionmakers: FEPA,  SEPAs  and the firms. It also provides an overview of
the major "policy" implications of this framework. Section 3 presents the simulations
for two  sectors  (Paper and  Printing  and  Food) of  the  various  forms  of  federal
3  . Other issues Include  instrument  selection  and policy coordination  across ministries.  The issues raised by instrument  selection  are not
addressed  here specifically  although  somc  of the simulations  illustrate  the potential or  fines and  pollution taxes  to achieve pollution  control
objectives.  A useful survey on instrument  slection is provided  by Eskeland  and Jimenez (1991). Other aspects  of policy coordination  are
reviewed  in Jack (1991).3
government intervention aiming at improving states and firms compliance with federal
requirements. Section 4 summarizes the main policy conclusions  and discusses their
generality. An analytical  prese$tation of the actual framework is  provided az an  Annex 0
2. A Game-Theoretical Framework to Assess Decentralixed Environmental Policy-iankiag
2.1. Motivating the Choice of the Analytical Framework
The institutional organization of pollution management in Brazil involves three
levels of agents: the FEPA, the SEPAs and the firms aa illustrated by Figure 1. The
FEPA relies  on SEPAs  to enforce federal  environmental regulation. SEPAs supervise firms
for.the  FEPA but also see  the firms as the source of tax revenue based on their output.
Under  the  current  institutional  set up  in Brazil,  better  enforcement  of  federal
requirements implies, in the short run, lower output and hence state revenue. This
assignment of responsibilities has then a built-in conflict of interest. In practice,
the SEPAs  do not collect directly the revenue from sales  or production taxes, but their
resources, including salaries, are paid from these sources of revenue. This is why the
incentive structure of the three levels of agents needs to be carefully designed.












Fiour. 1  The  Policy  Design  System  with  Action  Responses  and  Information  Feedback
A key aspect of the incentive structure requires an assessment of information
asymmetries.  There are  various sources  of information  asymmetries among the actors  that4
would require a careful aosessment. The source  we focus  on is  the degree of monitoring-
-i.e how much is the FEPA going to monitor the SEPAs, and how  much are the SEPAs going
to  monitor  the  firms?--. 4 Because  of  these  asymmetries,  Brazil's  institutional
structure for  pollution  control can be modeled  as a set of multilayer  hierachized
principal-agent  relationships.  As  pointed  out  by  Tirole  (1986), this  hierarchal
structure does not necessarily  boil down to a compounding of the basic production
inefficiency built in every pair of principal-agent relationship. 5 This is because
this more complex structure introduces the possibility of common interest between the
SEPAs and the  firms.6  When  the SEPAs perform well as agents  for the FEPA,  firms'
profits are cut and so is states tax revenue. Conversely, the SEPAs can improve both
their lot and that of the firms by cutting  on enforcement. The design of the incentive
structure is further complicated by the fact that there is a limit on the pollution
control effort that can be imposed  on the firms.  The exact limic depends on the extent
to  which the federal  government in  willing to  trade-off environment quality and growth.
Excessive punishment will close bubini=as  altogether which the federal government does
not  want either. In other words, there has to be a restriction on the size of the fine
and on the  monitoring  efforts.7  To  figure out the desirable  design of  pollution
management, the federal government has  to take the initiative in gathering information
on the behavior of the SEPAs and of firms. In game theoretical jargon, the FEPA is a
Stackelberg leader, the states and the firms are followers in their relation with the
FEPA and the three actors are playing a hierarchical Stackelberg game. Similarly, the
SEPA is a Stackelberg leader in its relation with the firms.
2.2, An  Overview of the Model and of its  Theoreticr1 Policy Implications
The model focuses on the vertical behavioral relationship between the FEPA, a
representative  SEPA  and  a  representative  firm. The  FEPA  is  assumed  to  know the
objectives  of  the  states  and firms.  States maximize  their  tax  revenue  and  firms
maximize their after-tax profits. These "followers" may know little about the FEPA's
4.  See Russell (1990a, 1990b)  for other sources  of information  asymmetry  relevant  to the  structuring  of monitoring  and  enforcement  isues.
5.  Holmstrom  and Tirolc (1989), pp  106-126,  provide  an  overview  of the very limited  literature  on hierarchies  in the theory of the firm.
6.  Tirole (1986)  deals explicitly  with collusion.  We do not directly  but implicitly  as without changes  in FEPA's behavior,  the SEPAs would
have  an incentive  to altnr  its behavior  in a way that also benefit  firms. Laffont  (1990)  also  adds  the possibility  of the ability  of some players  to
design  games  with other members  of the hierarchy  that  are not observable  to the principal.
7.  See Calvo  nd Wellisz  (1978) for a discussion  of this limit  in the context  of the punishment  of shirking  workers.
8.  A full description  and discussion  of the model is provided  in the annex.itention. They react  to the  FEPA's  strategy  selection  and  then  deuign  their  optimal
response.  This  reaction  process  is  known  to  the  leader,  who  take.  it into  account  when
it  optimizes  its  own  strategy.  Through  such  an independent  decision  system,  the  leader
res  its  own positional  advantage  to influence  the  follower's  strategy  selection  and
makes  i'  consistent  with its  o.in  objectives.  A similar  reasonLng  is  applied  to  the  role
of  the  SEPA as a Stackelbe:g  leader  in its  relation  with firms.
iL The firm's  perspective
The  firm's  problem  is  as  follows.  It  has  a  fixed  capital  stock  as  this  is  a  short
term model.  It can use it either  to produce  or to abate  pollution.  Its production
technology  is  associated  with  a  pollution  function.  This  function  depend.  on  the  output
level  and  on  the  abatement  intensity  and  technology.  The  "dirtier"  the  industry  and  the
lower  its  abatement  efficiency,  the larger  the investment  in abatement  required  to
satisfy  the  environmental  protection  legislation.  Finally,  the last  component  of the
firm's  problem  is  the  profit  function. The firm's  profits  are  affected  by two  taxes:
a  value  added  tax  and  a  possible  pollution  tax.  The  pollution  tax  is  based  on  emissions
and  can only be levied  if the SEPA checks  the firm. In sum, it is the "effective"
pollution  tax  that  matters.  This  effective  tax is  the  pollution  tax  corrected  by the
probability  of the firm to be monitored.  If the state never  monitors  a firm. Its
effective  tax  rate  is  zero.  In  practice  this  is  somewhat  how  fines  work in  many  states
in Brazil. A major difference  is that fines are not directly related to actual
emissions  in Brazil.  They are  more  related  to the frequency  of violation  than to the
intensity  or toxicity. A better solution,  currently under consideratLon  in some
Brazilian  states,  could  be  to  relate  the  tax  to  potential  pollution  as  derived  from  the
composition--i.e.  age,  model,  ...-- of  the  capital  stock.  Firms  would  then  get  penalized
for  not adopting  a cleaner  technology.
Within  this  framework  consisting  of the fLrm's  production  function,  pollution
function  and  profit  function,  the  firm  is  making  a  portfolio  selection:  how  to  allocate
its  fixed  amount  of capital  to two different  ends to maximize  its  expected  profit?
Shifting  one  unit  of  capital  from  production  to  pollution  control  has  two  effects:  (a)
it  generally  lowers  the firm's  output  and  thus its  sales  revenue;  but (b)  it reduces
pollution  and  thus its  potential  pollution  tax.
The  firm  chooses  its  investment  in  abatement  by comparing  the  marginal  cost  (MC)
of abating  pollution  with  the  marginal  benefit  (MB)  of  doing  so.  The  marginal  benefit
is  essentially  the  savings  in  pollution  tax liability  stemming  from  the investment  in
pollution  control.  it in  determined  by the pollution  tax  and the  pollution  intensity
of the  firm. The  marginal  cost  is  reflected  in  the  loss  in  after-tax  profits  due  to6
diversion  of resources  for pollution  abatement.  It is determined  by the effective
pollution  tax and  the investment  in  abatement.
The solution  of the firw.'s  problem  leads  to the following--many  of them very
intuitive--theoretical  policy  implications:  I
Policy Impilcation  is  Xf  the  marginal  cost of abatement  is greater  than  the
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Figure  2  The Firm's Optimal Choice of Investment
for  Pollution  Control
Figure  2 illustrates  geometrically  this policy  implication.  The  marginal  cost
curve  is linear  in abatement  investment  (C)  with a  positive  slope  while  the  marginal
benefit  curve  turns  out  to be  horizontal  since  it  does  not  change  with  the  level  of  C.
The firm's  spending  for  environment  protection  will be zero if its  marginal  cost is
greater  than its  marginal  benefit--e.g.  the  marginal  benefit  curve  is  MB'. This  case
will  happen  if: (a)  the  pollution  tax  rate  is  very low;  (b)  the SEPA  does not  comply
with  the  environmental  law  frequently;  (c)  the  environmental  protection  expenses  are
not  efficiently  used;  or (d)  the  firm's  production  pollutes  the  environment  in  a  not-
easy-to-monitor  way. In  this  case,  the  SEPA's  environmental  policy  does  not  affect  the
firm's behaviors in aspending  fundq for envirnnmental  protection.  This prompts
corrections  in  either  the  firm's  technical  set-ups  or the  SEPA's  inspection  structure.
The direction  of policy  changes,  which affects  the firm's  behavior  through  its  own
optimization  process,  can  be either  increasing  the  marginal  benefit  or  decreasing  the
9 . Their fonnsl derivation  is also provided  in the Appendix.7
marginal  cost  of  pollution  control  as  they  Lncrease  the  marginal  cost  of  polluting.
These  two  options  to  change  the  behavior  of  the  firm  lead  to  the  next  six policy
options:
Poicvllication  2  Given  the firm's  technical  parameters  (production
technology,  pollution  intensity  and  abatement  efficiency),  the  effectiveness  of
the  SSPA's  environmental  policy  is  determined  by  the  effective  pollution  tax  rate
rather than by its nomin_l pollution tax rate. A low  inspection  rate dirwounts
the  firm's  liability  on  pollution  tax.
Policy  Implication  3: If  the  SEPA has a  maximum  pollution  tolerance  level,
the  SEPA will  have a  minimum  pollution  tax  rate.  This  rate should  differ
with the  firms'  production  technology,  pollution  intensity  and  abatement
efficiency.
Policy  implication  4: With  a  positive  pollution  tax  rate,  the  more  frequently  the
SEPA  inspects  the  firm,  the  more the  firm  will allocate  to  pollution  control.
Policy  Imolication  5: An  increase  in  the  VAT will  also lead to short term
reductions  in  pollution.
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Fiouri  3  The  Firm's  Response  to  Policy  Changes8
Poligy  ImpLi_a_ktIon  6:  If the  structure  of  fines  is  proportiona)  to  the  amount  of
pollution,  subsidizing  research  projects  on  environmental  protection  or  subsidies
to the  purchase  of  more efficient  abatement  technology  by  firms,  would  improve
the  incentive  of firms  to invest  in abatement.
P-olicy  lmlication  7: Tax  rates, inspection  frequency and  research subsidie3 can
b. used  an substitutes  to  induce  the  firm to cut  pollution.
Figure  3 compares  the effects  of a sales tax and of a pollution  tax on the
decision  to invest  in  abatement.  This  result  is  driven  by  the  short  term  nature  of  the
model  and full  employment  assumption  of the  model  does  not  say  much about  the  ranking
of the instruments--a  firm  could  react  by cutting  capacity  utilization.  Once capital
becomes  variable  the  policymakers  -hould  not  view  the  two  types  of taxes  as
equivalent.  The pollution  tax  dominates  as it clearly  addresses  the  externality.
ii.  The SEPA's  perspective
The state government  is assumed  to emphasize  its tax revenue  which reflects
employment,  local  output  and  regional  development.  It  considers  environmental  quality
as secondary  to these macroeconomic  objectives. Knowing  the whole process  of the
firm's  decision  making,  the  SEPA  decides  an  inspection  frequency  to  monitor  the  firm's
performance  on environmental  protection.  Its  optimal  monitoring  choice  is  determined
by a  comparison  of its  marginal  costs  and  its  marginal  benefits  of  monitoring  as  shown
in Figure  4 (ii).
The  marginal  cost  consists  of  three  elements:  the  marginal  (and  average)  cost  of
conducting  inspection,  the  marginal  reduction  of the  value-added  tax  revenue,  and  the
marginal  tax loss  due  to shrinking  of the  pollution  tax  basis.  The  marginal  benefit
- of inspection  comes  from  two  sources:  the  increase  of  pollution  tax  actually  collected,
and  the savings  of the otherwise-paid  expected  penalty  to the federal  government.
The trade-off  the SEPA faces is that on one hand, a harsh  monitoring  scheme
induces  the firm to reduce its productive  capital and its output level and thus
decreases  the  SEPA's  value-addeL  wax  revenue.  It  also  reduces  net  revenue  as  monitoring
costs increase.  On the other hand, it may increase  the SEPA's  tax collection  from
pollution  tax and  avoid  possible  penalty  to the federal  governr,ient  if the  FEPA finds
out that  the  SEPA does  not  monitor  the firms.  The importance  of thic  cost  depends  on
the  federal  inspection  efforts.9
If the pressure  from the federal  government  is small--i.e.  the FEPA ignores
completely  how  well the SEPA  doee its  job--  as is currently  the case in Brazil,  the
SEPA's  marginal  cost of inspection  will surpass  the  corresponding  marginal  benefit.
This  is  represented  in  Figure  4 (i).  It  means  that  the  SEPA should  not  spend  any  time
monitoring  the  firms.  At the  other  extreme,  if  the  marginal  cost  of  monitoring  is  very
small,  the SEPA  should  do a perfect  monitoring  job  as shown  by Figure  4 (iii).
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Fiaure  4: The  SEPAs'  Monitoring  Choi'ze
How  the  FEPA  could  react  to  this  set  of  possible  of  outcomes,  is  summed  up in  the
next  three  policy  implications  of the  model  and illustrated  in Figure  5:
Policy  Implication  8:  An increase  in the federal  penalty  or inspection  level
will raise the  SEPA incentive to comply  with its obligations and  increase its own
monitoring  frequency--thus  reduce  pollution.-
Policy  ImDlication  9: Subsidies  to  cut the  states'  monitoring  costs  would  lead
the SEPA's to monitor more frequently and would hence reduce pollution.10
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Figure  S: Impact  of Changes  in  Federal  Fines  and  Monitoring  Costs
on the  SEPAs  Policy  Selection
Now  consider  the  case  in which  the  federal  government  has  an upper  bound  for the
level  of  pollution  it  is willing  to  live  with.  Just  like  a pollution  ceiling  had  an
effect  on the optimal  effective  pollution  tax  rate  for the states,  a federal  pollution
ceiling  has  an  impact  on the  optimal  federal  fine.  More  specifically:
Policy  Imolication  10:  If  the  FEPA  has  a  maximum  standard  for  the  pollution
Intensity  In  the  environment,  it can  define  a set  of appropriate  penalty  level
and  inspection  rate  such  that  its  target  on  environment  protection  can  be
achieved  through  changes  in  the  behavior  of  states  and  hence  of firms.
iii.  The  FEPA'.  perspective
The  Federal  government--represented  by  the  FEPA--  wants  to promote  growth  but
also wants  to keep  pollution  under  control.  The model  allows  to simulate  various  levels
of  distaste  for  pollution.  This  can  be  used  to  simulate  the  changes  in the  expected
behavior  of  the  FEPA  that  would  result  from  changes  in pressure  intensity  from  the11
population or from organized lobbies. It relies on the SEPAs to ensure that the firms
comply  at least  with the  minimum federal  environmental requirements. To ensure that the
SEPAs  do their job, it needs  to inspect  the states and  may consider to oomehow fine the
poor performing states. The FEPA picks its  monitoring rate by comparing its marginal
costs of inspection to its marginal benefits.
The FEPA's marginal cost of monitoring is composed of (i) its  marginal (and  also
average) cost of conducting monitoring, (Ui)  marginal utility loss from reduction of
the firm's output, and (iii)  the reduction of the expected penalty collection from the
SEPA.  The FEPA's  marginal benefit includes the  marginal utility from  the reduction of
pollution level  and  the marginal increase  of  the expected penalty collection due to its
harsher monitoring.  The understanding of the composition of the marginal  cost and
benefits leads to the last two--and rather obvious-- policy implications:
Policy Implication 11:  The more the  FEPA dislikes pollution, the  more often the
FEPA will monitor the  SEPA's performance and hence the lower pollution will be.
Policy Implication 12: Reducing the FEPA's inspection cost will contribute to
alleviate environmental pollution.
Therefore, a smaller inspection cost will reduce the PEPA's aggregate marginal
cost  of  inspection  and  thus  raise  the  FEPA's optimal  inspection  rate.  In response  to
this  federal  policy  change,  the  SEPA  will  adjust  its  monitoring  frequency.
Consequently, the firms' portfolio  is altered and the pbllution  intensity level is
reduced.
3.  Numerical Policy Simulations for Brazil
This section  presents numerical  simulations  illustrating  the  practical importance
of some of the policy conclusions derived from the theoretical model. The PimulatLons
focus on sectoral data at firm level data are not available. They require data on
sectoral capi_al stocks, outputs and an indicator of the pollution  intensity. These
data  are  not  available  for  all  sectors  as discussed  in the  Appendix.  The  data
available, however, allow a rough (OLS)  estimate of the production function for a few
sectors. This provides the basic technical parameters representing the efficiency of
productive capital. The  abatement rate of the pollution control  investment can be
selected  exogenously to reflect its  reduction  efficiency. The policy parameters are  the12
value-added tax rate, the pollution tax rate, the mc.nitoring  costs for the SEPA, the
inspection costs for the FEPA, the federal penalty level and a coefficient reflecting
the relative level of the federal government aversion to pollution.
The weakness  of  the  data  base  implies that  the  specific  numerical  results
obtained here are not robust enough to be able to make specific recommendations on
policy decisions such as the optimal federal fine or inspection rate or on the optimal
pollution tax or monitoring rate. The numerical results are however robust enough to
illustrate the importance of some specific aspects of the design of pollution control
policies  such  as  the  size of  fines or  of the  pollution  tax,  the  differences  in
monitoring and inspection requirements of dirty and clean industries or the potential
role of subsidies to the firms or to the states.
The  illustration  focuses  on  the  Printing  and  Publishing  sector  as  a
representative  dirty  industry and  on the Food  sector as  a  representative cleaner
industry  as shown by  Table 1. For  these two sectors, the coefficients of the production
functions were  statistically  significant. They are  likely to be somewhat outdated
however as they are based on data for  the seventies.  For pollution intensity,  we relied
on series prepared by David Wheeler and his  team in  the Environmental Department of the
World Bank. The series provide measures of toxicity per sector in  the U.S.  When applied
to Brazilian production  data,  they provide an  indicator of  the absolute  level of
pollution generated by each sector in  the sample.1 0 The estimates suggest that Printing
and Publishing is a much more polluting industry than the food industry per unit of
capital. However  while  it is  also much more  polluting per  unit of output,  it is
actually  somewhat  less polluting  that the  Food sector when  production  levels are
accounted for.  The Food industry is indeed  much larger  than the printing  and publishing
industry in the country. In absolute termsg both sectors are in the top 5 polluting
sectors for the sample selected.
This section is  organized as follows. It first  presents a detailed discussion of
the  optimal inspection and  monitoring policies for  the  two case studies. Next, focusing
on  the  dirty  industry,  Printing  and  Publishing,  it provides  simulations  of  the
importance  of fines,  VAT rates,  pollution tax rates  and abatement efficiency levels  for
the success of pollution control.
10.  The  selection  of the  sample  was  based  on  the  infonnation  available  to estimate  the  capital  stock.  Only  those  sectors  in  the  SffC  categories
for  which  capital  stock  could  be estimated  were  rtined.13
Table 1: Rankins of Pollution Intensitv for a Samnle of Industries
(1980)
.*..*...  *.................:~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~::..  . ... :...  ..  .
Leather & Products  1  6
Plastic Products  2  2
Printing & Publishing  3  5
Other Paper Products  4  1
Drugs & Medicine  5  11
Non-Ferrous Metal  6  3
Furniture  7  9
Wood Product  8  7
Other Textile Products  9  8
Rubber Products  10  10
Transport Equipment  11  12
Food Products  12  4
Tobacco  13  14
Beverages  14  13
3.1  Comparing Optimal Policies for "Dirty" and "Clean" Industries
This  section  illustrates  the  differences  in the  optimal  federal  and  state
behavior in the treatment of clean and dirty industries. The abatement efficiency is
supposed to be twice the value of pollution intensity (w  - 2 4' in the notation of the
Annex) in each one of the sectors. This arbitrary choice does not affect the core  of
the results as will be clear by the end of this section. This means--from equation (4)
in the Annex--, that to completely eliminate pollution in either sector, the maximum
share  of investment in pollution control in total capital should  be 33.3%. In addition
to the difference in terms of 4,  the sector differ in the productivity of capital and
in the level of output. A summary comparison the results is provided in Table 2.
The  discussion  focuses  on  the  impact  of  optimal  inspection  and  monitoring
policies on private investment  in  abatement, output, pollution and  on federal and  state
revenue implications  of pollution control.  Most cases are  normalized to the value taken
by that variable when there is no federal inspection and no state monitoring.
The model is solved for each one the three agents. First, the utility of the
federal  government, a proxy for  the economy's social  welfare, is  computed as  a  function
of  the SEPA's  inspection of  the firms. In  the  model, the inspection rate increases from
0% to 100%, steppLng with 5%. Since the federal utility level varies with its degree
of aversion, X, the utility is calculated for three degrees of aversion to pollutions
no aversion  (X=O),  low  aversion  (X= 0.1),  high  aversion  (X=1).  For  food,  the  optimal14
no aversion (X=O), low aversion (X=  0.1), high aversion (X=1). For food, the optimal
degree of federal inspection varies with X from 10%  to 100%. It  reaches 100% for a high
degree  of  aversion.  For  Printing  and  Publishing,  it  requires  less  than  perfect
inspection only  when there is  no aversion to  pollution. Thia suggests  that even at  very
low  levels of  aversion, the  federal  government should  allocate more  resources to
inspecting the states' monitoring of dirty industries.
To every degree of federal inspection corresponds an optimal degree of state
inspection.  This optimal degree  of inspection  does not  necessarily match the first  best
policy  for the  state. In fact, states revenue will be  less when SEPA's choice of
monitoring efforts is constrained by the federal leadership as shown by Table 2. For
Food, it will be at least 10% less (167%/186%), for Printing & Publishing, it will be
48% less (75%/143%). In the case of the clean industry, the revenue from the pollution
tax can however be sufficient to offset the loss from VAT revenue. Only when the FEPA
is  very  averse  to  pollution  will  it  lead  to  a  lower  revenue  than  without  any
monitoring. This is precisely why  when the FEPA is very averse to pollution or when the
industries are very dirty, federal inspection rates have to be perfect  (100%). In
addition,  if the FEPA does not monitor the SEPAs, they will  tend to monitor more
frequently clean industries than dirty industries. The unconstrained optimum state
monitoring is 45% for food but 40% for Printing and Publishing.
Similarly  to  every  degree  of  state monitoring  corresponds  an  optimal  firm
behavior  which  leads  to  a  specific  combination  of  output  and  pollution.  This
combination is in fact driven by the effective pollution tax rate. For a given nominal
tax rate, a minimum  level of state monitoring is required to ensure that the firms
start investing in  pollution control. It is 44.9%  for  the clean industry and 3.4% for
the dirty industry. This is due to the much larger revenue payoff of a control of the
dirty sector. It  also reflects the fact the optimal federal fine  on states for failing
to monitor firms is larger the dirtier the industry."
The  process just described is known to the FEPA. Hence, based on the impact of
its inspection efforts on the states and on the firms, behavior, the FEPA picks the
inspection rate that will lead  to a combination of pollution and output that maximizes
the social welfare function. The optimal degree of firms monitoring by the states is
the  degree  at  which federal utility is maximized. Once more it depends on the federal
aversion to pollution.  The stronger the federal aversion to pollution and the dirtier
the industry, the larger the monitoring effort required from the state. The state's
11.  Tne optinuI  federal fine  is defined  as the fine level such  that if federal  inspection  b  perfect,  it will induce perfect  monitoring  of  firms
by the sttes.is
posltion  reflects  a combination  of  the impact  of federal  fines,  and net  revenue  from
states  VATs and  pollution  taxes.  The share  of capital  allocated  to pollution  control
by  the  flrm  iL  then  based  on  the  degree  of  state  monitoring  and  the  pollution  tax  rate.
These influence  the output level that will maximize  profits.  The output level and the
abatement  efficiency  of capital  then  determlne  the  new  pollution  level.
In  addition  to  the  lmpact  on  profits,  pollution  control  reforms  would  also  change
states'  revenue  and  have  implications  for  the  federal  budget.  The  implications  on the
state's  budget  depend  on VAT revenue,  net  pollution  tax  revenue  and the fine  levels.
VAT revenue  are  offset  by the lncreased  net revenue  from a pollution  tax.  Revenue
needs  to be considered  on a net  basis  as  monitoring  is not free.  There  is however  no
rellable  data  on  monitorlng  cost  at this  stage  and  these  are  not  considered  important
in the simulations  presented  above.  We define  an optimal  penalty  level  instead.
Flnally,  the  effective  fine  set  by the  FEPA also  contributes  to determine  the states'
choice.  It reflects  both the level  of the fine  and the  monitoring  efforts  discussed
above.  In general,  the level  of the optimal  fine  will also  depend  on the polluting
nature  of the  sector.  Assuming  flxed  common  standards  for  all  industries,  the  dirtier
the  industry,  the  larger  the  fines  should  be.  This  holds  even if  in  absolute  terms  the
Food sector  generates  more pollutlon  than the Printlng  and Publishing  sector.  In
budgetary  terms, it means that if the federal  government  is even mildy averse  to
pollution,  lt wlll need to accept a deficit in its monitoring activities--i.e.
pollution  control  has  to be subsidized.  32
In sum,  Table  2 shows  that  the federal  government  should  focus  its inspection
efforts  on the quality  of State's  monitoring  of dirty industries.  This reflects  the
importance  of federal  averslon  to  pollution.  But  more  importantly,  it  reflects  the  fact
that to maximize  net revenue and minimize  the output losses implied  by stronger
monltorlng,  without  federal  supervision,  the  SEPAs  are  more likely  to focus  on large
clean  lndustries  than on dirty industries  because  of the combined  VAT and  pollution
revenue is higher for those industries.  To achieve this objective,  the federal
government  may  need  to allocate  resources  to assume  the  cost implied  by inspection  as
for  dirty industries  and/or  high pollutlon  aversion,  inspection  cost are generally
larger  than fines  revenue.
12 . 'Me  federal  mnonitoring  cost picked  in the model is arbit;rily  set at 10%  of the value of the optimal  federal fine.16
Table  2: Com2arino  OntImal  Policies  for  Dirty  and  Clean  industries
(Policies  that  Maximize  the  Federal  Welfare)
.......  .......  . ....  . ....  ...  . . ....  . ....  ..  . ....  ...  ...  :...  . . . ..  . . . ..  . . . .
Optimal  Federal  Inspection
Rate for Various Degree  of
Averson  to  Polution OM
no aversion  10%  15%
low aversion  45%  100%
high aversion  100%  100%
Ootimapl  Stte Monitoring  Rate
With Federal Intervention
no federal  aversion  52%  100%
low federal  aversion  71%  100%
high federal  aversion  100%  100%
With no Federal  Intervention  4S%  40%
InvextMgnt  in Pollution  Control
with Federal  Intervention  and
no aversion  5.5%  19.7%
low aversion  14.3%  33.2%
high aversion  30.0%  33.2%
with no Federal  Intervention  0%  12.6%
Minimum  State Monitoring  Required  for
a Non-zero  Investment  in Pollution  Control  44.9%  3.4%
Pollution  Level (as % of current)
with Federal  Intervention  and
no aversion  88%  49%
low aversion  58%  I %
high aversion  10%  I %
with no Federal  Intervention  100%  62%
Value Added  (as % of current)
with Federal  Intervention  and
no aversion  97%  93%
low aversion  88%  75%
high  aversion  68%  75%
with no Federal  Intervention  100%  96%
Stats Net Revenue  (s  Y of current VAT revenuel
with Federal  Intervention  and
no aversion  167%  75%
lowaversion  101%  75%
high aversion  87%  75%
with no Federal  Intervention  186%  143%
Feder  Net  Revenue  (as %  of current  VAT revenu
with Federal  intervention  and
no aversion  14%  15%
low aversion  32%  -24%
high  aversion  -37%  -24%
with no  Federal  Intervention  0%  0%17
3.2 Implications of Reforms for the Printing and Publishing Sector
3.2.1  Which Government Level Should Try to Improve Abatement Efficiency?
Abatement efficiency is  a critical  variable for the success of pollution control
policies. Improvements in abatement efficiency could be a very successful policy as
illustrated by  Table  3. A  tenfold  increase  in  abatement  efficiency  could  reduce
pollution  by  23% more  while  reducing output,  as  compared  to  a  situation  without
pollution control, by only 3% instead  of 21%. This stems from the fact that the maximum
share of capital to be allocated to pollution control is cut from 67% to 17%. Social
welfare will be maximized at  levels  of investment in abatement somewhat lower: 28% for
an X  of 0.5 and 11% for an w  of 5.
These  results  suggest that the  government  should  consider  subsidies  to  the
research  in this  area  or  assist  the  firms in  acquiring more  efficient  abatement
technology.  It is unlikely,  however, that the states will be willing  to make the
effort. Table 3 shows that, assuming that states only care about revenue, states would
be better off with  low efficiency abatement technology.  A  tenfold  improvement  in
technology would cut the combined net VAT and pollution tax revenue to just over a
third of what it would  be  without the improvement. In fact, the new revenue would be
even somewhat lower than without any investment in abatement. This revenue erosion
mostly reflects the reduction in pollution and in the optimal pollution tax rates." 3
If state monitoring Costs were also important,  they would further erode revenue as the
optimal monitoring rate implied  by the FEPA's position is  more than twice the original
requirement.
In sum, if  a subsidy  could contribute to the improvement of abatement efficiency
available to firms, it should be considered by the Federal government rather than by
the states. It should, however, compare the degree of improvement in technology to the
cost of the subsidy. Doubling abatement efficiency would not achieve much in absolute
reduction in pollution. But if the cost of a subsidy represents less than 8% of the
current value added,  it may be worth to consider  it because doubling the original
abatement efficiency  would increase output by 8%.14
13.  Tho  optimal  pollution  tax  rte  is the rate rquired to cut pollution  to 0 whenthc SEPAs are monitoring  perfectly  (100%).
14.  An additional,  mnybe  nore  audacious,  conclusion  from the samne  data would recommend  an approach  to the selection  of firms  to monitor
within  a specific  sector.  Asunme  that the technical  coefficients-i.e.  the marginal  productivity  of capital-for all the firms  in the sector are the
samt.  Asme  aloO  that fiwns  only  vary in terms  of pollution  intensity.  Ten  Table  3 implies  that the firns for which  the increase  in abatement
efficiency  can be the largest  should  be more likely to be monitored  because  stte  monitoring  requirements  increase  with abatement  efficiency.
In practical  terms, this means  that the  SEPAs should  keep firms  with older capital in closer check than firms with more  recent capital  if it is
likely to be less polluting.  It also implies  that if a subsidy  is to be allocated  for investment,  they should  go to the older firms first if they have
the same  narginal productivity  of capital  as the tnore recent  firms.18
,e.,'  i.  '  in  'Aat.  nt  Efficienc  Rat  :
Abatement  Efficiency  Rate as  % of Pollution/capital
(C, as t  of  P)
50%  100%  200%  500%
Foderal  Xncpmaction  Required  (for  10094  100%  100%  100%
low  pollution  aversion;  X-.1)
Federal  Penalty Level Required an  30.7%  30.7%  30.7%  30o7%
% of original  VAT revenue
Net  Federal  Fine Revenue  as % of  13.5%  13.3%  11.8%  5.8%
original  VAT revenue (for  a
conetant  fine)
Reculting  State  Monitorlng  46%  48%  51%  71%
Minimum  Monitoring  required  for
firm  to  invest  in  control  1.7%  2.3%  3.4%  6.6%
Net  State  Revenue  as % of
original  VAT revenue  251%  179%  128%  98%
Nominal  Pollution  Tax required  to
reduce  pollition  to 0 with
perfect  SEPA  monitoring  10.4cts/lb  5.9cts/lb  2.6cte/lb  .7cts/lb
FlRM  (at  the  level  of  monitoring
implied  by  the  federal  attitude)
Inveotment  in  Pollution  Control
as % of  total capital  28%  24%  16%  11%
Max.  investment  in  control  as  a  t
of  total  capital  67%  50%  33%  17%
Pollution  Level  am % of original  55%  55%  51%  32%
Value  added  am %  of original  79%  87%  93%  97%
. 3.2.2.  Do States  React  to Chanoes  in Federal  Fines?
The previous set of simulations  established  that for dirty industries,  the
federal  government  should  monitor  the  states  perfectly  when  the  fines  are  set  at  their
optimal  level.  But  what  if  the  fines  cannot  be  set  at  the  optimal  level?  This  implies
that  the  effective  fine,  considering  both  inspection  and  fine  levels,  will  also  be  sub-
optimal.  This  will  reduce the  states'  incentive  to adopt  the  monitoring rate that will
manituite  social  welfare.  Since lt is  generally  unrealistic  to  assume  that  fines  will19
be optimal,  it is  useful  to see  the  extent  to which  the fine level  matters. 5 s  A3  set
of simulations  shows how changes in the level of federal fines, expressed as  a
percentage  of  the  VAT  revenue  without  pollution  control,  affects  the  main  variableo  of
the  economy.
First  of all,  it  iQ  clear  that  if  the  fine  in  trivial,  the  FEPA  might  as  well  not
monitor  the states.  In  other  words,  if  the federal  government  was to consider  fining
states  as a policy  instrument  to improve  the  environment,  it  has  to be willing  to pay
for  this  activity  and  include  into  its  budgetary  requests  even  if it is only  somewhat
averse  to pollution.
Assuming  that  the fine  level  is  directly  linked  to the cost  of monitoringz-say
10  times  for  the  purpose  of simulations--,  inspections  will  generally  cost  more than
they will yield.  The  larger  the cost, the larger  the optimal  fine to achieve  zero
pollution,  but also the lower  the  effective  fine  as the threat  increases  and state
compliance  improves.  Hence  the  larger  the  federal  deficit  from  its  inspection
operations.  Fines  do not  have  to  be related  to cost  and  if  this  were  not  the  case,  the
FEPA  may  end  losing  less  that  suggested  by Table  4.  But  it  is  likely  to lose  when  state
compliance  improves  as a result  of perfect  federal  inspections.  The social  welfare
payoffs  of the changing  combination  of pollution  and  output  increase  with the fines
levels.  But  the  states  end  up  worse  off  as  the  fines  level  increase.  The  deterioration
is  not  due  to an increase  in  the  effective  costs  of penalties  but  to the  reduction  in
net  revenue.  When federal  fines  are  optimal,  even  pollution  tax  revenue  is  not  enough
to offset  the  loss  from  value  added  tax  revenue  and  states  net  revenue  drop  to 94%  of
their  original  value.  The  absence  of fines  does  not  mean  however,  that  the  states  will
not do anything  in terms  of pollution  control.  In fact, as the next section  will
illustrate  more clearly,  the  mere existence  of the pollution  tax, even at a  modeet
rate,  is  sufficient  to lead  to  an  improvement  in  the  environment.  For  the  specific  case
illustrated  by Table  4, even  when  the  federal  government  does not  inspect  the states,
state  revenue is 144% of what it would have been without the pollution tan and
pollution  is only  57%  of its  original  level.
From  a  practical  aspect,  fines  can  take  several  form.  One  form  that  it  could  take
in  Brazil  would  be a reduction  i%  Federal  Transfers.  This is  particularly  interesting
in  the  context  of  pollution  as  the  Federal  government  is  cofinancing  various  operations
with  the  states.  This  cofinancing  often  takes  the  form  of a  matching  grant.  Introducing
15  From  an  dnistrativpoint  of  view,  the  fine will hav to be unique or  t wors be  differentiated ccording  th  pollution tnity  of
capital  of the setor  and to pollution  level.  To derive the corresponding inimum  rate of inspection  required,  take equation  (24), at the =to
monitoring  level to the minimum  required  to have finns  invest in abatement  and  the fine level selected,  then aolve  for eta.20
conditionality  for the disbursement  of the grant  could be related  to the monitoring
efforts  of the states.  The reduction  in  the grant amount  for  non-compliance  would  be
equivalent  to  a fine.  Now, it in  politically  unrealistic  to asaume  that  the fine  could
wipe  out state  revenue  or even  anything  close  to  half  these  revenue.  But  the  magnitude
ot'  the  costs  of some  of  the  projects--think  of  Guanabara  in  Rio  de  Janeiro  or  Rio  Tiete
in Sao Paulo--  is so impressive,  that  the federal  grant  component  could  easily  reach
a third  of the  tax revenue  of a state  for  any  given  year.  In  those  cases,  fines  would
be in the range defined by the second and third column of  the Table. However, the
improvements  in  pollution  levels  achieved  by  the  fine  are  not  significantly  higher  than
those  achieved  from  the pollution  tax only.
. Table  4:  atofh  e.in  te  ;e  deral  li  i.  the Stt:
Federal  Fine  as % of original  States'  VAT Revenue
Q  L0.0515.3%  30 7  3  15%.3%  246.1%
Utility  Naximizing
Inspection  level  for low
pollution  aversion  0.0%  100%  100%  100%  100%
Social  Welfare (%  of Case  100%  163%  223%  592%  746%
with Fine-0)
Net Federal  Fine Revenue  0.0%  6.4%  11.8%  16.9%  -24.5%
as % of original  VAT
revenue
STATE
Resulting  State  Monitoring  44%  48%  51%  79%  100%
Net  State  Revenue  as % of
original  VAT revenue  144%  135%  128%  85%  92%
Nominal Pollution  Tax
required  to  cut  pollutlon
to 0 w/ perfect  SEPA  2.6cts/lb  2.6ctu/lb  2.6cts/lb  2.6ct5/lb  2.6cts/lb
monitoring
Investment  in  Abatement  (%
of total capital)  14t  15%  16%  26%  33%
Pollution (%  of original)  57%  55%  51%  32%  5%
Production (%  of original)  95%  94%  93%  84%  75%21
In sum, fines are necessary to establish the credibility  of  the  federal
government  penallzation  of states  that  do  not  assume  their  monitoring  role  with  enough
conviction.  However,  to cut the pollution  levels  significantly  below the reduction
achieved  by  the  pollution  tax,  fines  may  have  to  reach  levels  politically  unrealistic.
Their  value is hence  somewhat  limited  and  mostly  complementary  to the impact  of the
introduction  of a pollution  tax  at the state  level.
3.2.3  Why do Pollution  Taxes  Matter  So  Much to All  Levels  of Governments?
The  discussion  has  so far  shown  that  the  pollution  tax  is  a crucial  component  of
the  success  of decentralized  pollution  control.  But  previous  results  have shown  that
the  optimal  pollution  tax  will  vary  across  rectors.  For  instance,  the  larger  the  degree
of abatement  efficiency  available  to the firms,  the lower  the required  optimal  tax
rate.1'  The  optimal  rate also  varies  with the  pollution  intensity  of the sector.  The
cleaner  the industry,  the  larger  the "legal  "  tax  rate  required.1 7 For  instance,  the
optimal  federal  inspection  level  would lead  to an optimal  pollution  tax rate in  the
Food  sector  about  4 times  larger  than  in the  Printing  and  Publishing  sector.  This is
driven  by  the  lower  minimum  monitoring  requirement  for  the  cleaner  industry. But  since
in  practice  the  pollution  tax rate  is likely  to be uniform,  it is useful  to see  what
happens  when the  rate is  not  optimal. This is illuntrated  by Table  5."8
The  most  interesting  result  of  Table  5  is  that,  for  a  given  constant  federal  fine
level  equivalent  to about 15% of VAT revenue,  the optimal  inspection  rate for the
federal  government  is 0 for  very low  pollution  tax rates.  This is because  the FEPA
knows that to maximize  revenue,  the states  would have to monitor perfectly.  This
16.  Relying  on the Inteipretation  of abatement  efficiency  given in footnote  21. It suggest  that the older the  capital stock,  the larger  the
abateenw  efficiency  Is likely  to be to have  the firm meach  levels  of emission  per unit  of capital  comparable  to firms  relying  on newer  technolosy.
If this Interpretation  holds, it Inplies that the older fimsm  should  be taxed less  that the newer  firms. This means  that when firms  have to make
new  investment  decisions,  they'd better  consider  the fact  that they will  be more penalized  that in the pact for not being  up to sndards with  the
latest  development  in pollution  reduction  built in capital.
17.  Togetthis optiml  taxrate,takeequatiot  (i1),ettheta-  lOO%andP=Oandthensolveforthepollutiontax.  Remebertatths  firm
isnfluenceby the  effective  tax  rate  which  correspondsto  the nominal  tax  fate weighted  by the degee of monitoring.  When  monitorng is perfect,
the  effective  tax rate is equal  to the  sttutory  tax rate.
18.  The  reults are convuted for an  abteent  efficiency  of 2 and  a Federl Piinc  level of IS.3% the original  sales  tax rvenue.22
results  obtains  because  monitoring  costs  are asoumed  to be small.  Larger  costs  would
qualify these conclusions."1
These  results  however  also  give food  for  thoughts  if  the federal  government  is
willing  to consider  suboidies  of  the  monitoring  activities.  Table  5  suggeots  that,  for
a given level  of sales  tax revenue,  as long as monitorlng  costs  do not offset  the
revenue  from  pollution  taxes,  the  states  will  have  an incentive  to  monitor  to  capture
the potential  pollution  tax revenue.  While  this is not addressed  explicitly  in this
version  of  the  model,  this  implies  that  the  federal  government  should  compare  the  costs
of inspecting  the states  against  the  cost  of subsidizing  monitoring  by the states.
Tible.5:  Ylc  o.rcnce-  ofrPollut  tiiio'n'Tes  f'or"POAlutins  Cotr 
Pollution  Tax  Rate
(in  cts/lb)
2.63  0.10  1.00  10
Utility  Maximizing  Federal  Inspection
level  for low  pollution  aversion  100%  0%  0%  100%
Net Federal  Monitoring  Revenuae  as % of
state  revenue)  6.4%  0%  0%  12%
STATB
Federally  mandated  State  Monitoring  48%  100%  100%  11.3%
MLnimum  monitoring  required  for  firms  to  3.4%  89.2%  8.9%  0.9%
invest  in abatement
Net State  revenue  as % of  original  VAT
revenue  135%  107%  143%  127%
FIRM (at  the level  of monitoring  implied
by the federal  attitude)
Investment  in Pollution  Control  as % of
total  capital  15%  0.14%  11.88%  11.89%
Pollution  Level  as % of orLginal  55%  99.58%  64.37%  56.72%
Value  added  as % of original  94%  99.99%  96.35%  94.78%
19 . This will be addresed in a follow-up  paper which will include a diacuaion of eltemative  modes  or  fuuncing of thea cos  and their
incidence  on the federal and stte budgets.23
Table 5 also shows  that leaving  the  selection  of the  pollution  tax rat- to the
state  may  not  be in  the  best  interest  of the  environment. Setting  the  tax  at I  cts/  lb
of pollutant  for instance  would lead the state to monitor perfectly  but would not
provide  the  incentive  for  the  firm  to  curb  pollution  as  much  an it  could.  The firms  will
invest  less  in  pollution  control  than  under  an  optimal  tax  of 2.6cts/lb.  The  reason  why
there  is a  risk  to leave  the  choice  of the  tax  rate  to the  state  is  that  by choosing  a
low  rate,  the  state  can  collect  more  revenue  than  by choosing  the  optimal  tax  rate  while
still.  complying  with the 100%  monitoring  requirement  of the federal  government.  This
leads  to more saleo tax revenue  for the state  but also to higher  pollution  levels
because  a lower  than  optimal  effective  tax  rate  is  equivalent  to a lower  than  required
incentive  for firms  to invest  sufficiently  in pollution  control.  In other  words,  the
marginal  benefit  of investment  in  abatement  in  terms  of reduced  pollution  tax  liability
is lower  than the marginal  cost driven by the reduction  in value added and hence
profits.
There is however  an additional  important  consideration  for the design  of the
pollution  tax.  It is unlikely  that  the federal  government  will  be able to set  the  tax
at its  optimal  level  for  every  sector.  In  general,  the  pollution  tax  should  be a single
flat rate  tax to maintain  it manageable.  The effective  tax rate will be adjusted  by
diversifying  the  monitoring  effort.  As  mentioned  earlier,  thls  monitoring  effort  can  be
oriented  by the  federal  inspection  rate.  The process  however  depends  on the statutory
tax  rate  defined  in  the  law.  What  happens  to those  setors  for  which  the  legal  rate  is
higher  than the optimal  tax rate?  Setting  the tax rate too high as compared  to the
optimal  may also cut the SEPA's  incentive  to perform  well a monitor  of the firms  as
shown  by  the last  column  of Table  5. But  more importantly  it  cuts  so much into  profits
that  it reduces  both  the  tax  base for  the  VAT and  for  the  pollution  tax.
Take  the  case  of  the  dirty  industry  when  the  federal  fine  is  set  at about  15%  of
the  state  revenue  level  and  the  abatement  efficiency  is twice  the  pollution  intensity.
The optimal pollution  tax is then 2.63cto/lb.  The  revenue from the pollution  tax
increases  very quickly  with the monitoring  rate but then starts  declining  when the
monitoring  rate  reaches  50%.  Total  revenue  starts  declining  when  monitoring  is around
40%. However,  if the pollution  tax is lOcts/lb,  both  pollution  tax and total  revenue
starts  declining  when monitoring  rate reaches  10%.  The only cases in the  Aimulations
discussed  so  far  where  this  phenomenon  is  not  observed  was  when  the  pollution  taxes  were
very low.  The  peak pollution  tax revenue  was then  reached  for 100%  SEPA  monitoring  of
firms.  When  this  "Laffer  curve" of  pollution  tax  revenue  is  observed,  it is  due  to  the24
increase in investment in abatement that results from increased monitoring.  While the
Federal government may be satisfied by the existence of such a curve as it shows that
the pollution tax base is shrinking fast, the states  may not be as enthusiastic as their
VAT base is shrinking and is not compensated by an increase in the pollution tax base.
In fact, when the pollution tax rate is too high, the state never has an incentive to
do more than what the Federal government wants it to do. Monitoring more than required
cuts its revenue  and may  end  up closing business  as profits may  turn  negative at
excessive tax  rates. This observation  contributes to justify the need  for federal
inspection. This last point is crucial because the dirtier an industry, the lower the
required legal tax rate (as  monitoring will be large), so the more likely that any the
legal tax decided is likely to be excessive. In practice, it could also mean that the
firm will start replacing investment in abatement by reduction in output as a mean of
cutting pollution and hence the pollution tax base. In other words, the higher the tax
rate, the more likely dirty firms are likely to drop out of the market.
The firm's switch from investment in abatement to plain reduction in output is
however very slow. To be able to achieve a significant change in  the firm's  behavior as
compared to the nnt-imal  tax rate,  the statutory rate had to be set at almost five  time
the optimal rate. This is  because the elasticity  of most of the important  variables such
as value added, investment in pollution control and pollution level  with respect to the
pollution tax rate are much larger at low levels of monitoring that at levels that go
beyond the optimal rate as shown by Table 6. In  other words, the tax starts working very
fast on  the firms'  and  states' behavior  and then  its effect  starts to  decline as
illustrated by the last  column of Table 6. It shows  that the elasticity of the pollution
tax revenue with respect to the effective tax rate changes sign as the effective tax
rate reaches 50%.2 In practice, this is  why penalties currently applied by Brazil's
SEPA's are so successful but not quite enough. Indeed, most states rely on fines to
penalize firms for  non compliance. These fines  work like pollution taxes in  many states.
Their level changes with the level of pollution observed during the random monitoring
of the firm. In sum, it  means that the state governments are in the right direction but
thev  are  not  going  far enough.  They  could  raise much  more  revenue  by  increasing
monitoring efforts and at the same time achieve improvements in the environment. Their
behavior is  driven by the mistaken belief that stronger effective tax rates, reflecting
20.  bis  holds for the assumptionsbuilt  in the Table which represent  the optimal situation  for  a fine Ievel  of I5%  of VAT revenue and
abatement  efficiency  of 2.25
higher fines or better enforcement would lead  to less tax  revenue.  In  fact,  as  shown by
Table 5, they are more likely to err by setting the effective rate too  low than by
setting it too high.
A last important aspect relating to the pollution tax is also provided by Table
6. It shows how fast the pollution tax works. While its stronger impact on investment
in abatement is at low effective tax rates, the  major  impact on value added and on
pollution  intensity is at high effective tax rate. This also makes  the case  for a
combination of monitoring and statutory tax rates that is not too low if the tax is to
have  more  than  just  a  revenue  effect  but  is  also  expected  to  improvement  the
environment.
Table 6: Elasticity of the Main Variables with respect to
a 1% increase in the Effective  Pollution Tax  Rate
. ...... ~~~~~~~,.  . .,....  .......  . ......
0%  0  0  0  0
10%  1.51  -0.01  -0.11  0.89
20%  1.20  -0.02  -0.25  0.75
30%  1.13  -0.05  -0.43  0.57
40%  1.09  -0.08  -0.66  0.34
50%  1.07  -0.14  -0.99  0.01
60%  1.06  -0.20  -1.48  -0.48
70%  1.05  -0.28  -2.30  -1.30
80%  1.04  -0.39  -3.91  -2.91
90%  1.04  -0.52  -8.60  -7.60
100%  1.03  -0.68  -216.38  -215.38
To sum up, the discussion so far has demonstrated the critical importance of the
pollution tax to the success of pollution  management in a  decentralized economy such as
Brazil. It  will however be impossible  to set  the rate at an optimal rate for all sectors
and hence a flat rate will be required. The states will have to adjust their monitoring
rate across sectors to differentiate the effective tax rate. While setting the rate too
high  may be preferable to setting it  low, it  may be important to recognize the political
economy aspects of  the tax.  Brazil's  firms are already  facing  a large set  of tax
instruments and adding a new one now may not be feasible. One approach would be to26
simply systematize the use of fines and to design it  as a predictable source of revenue
for the states, thereby increasing its  value as a complement to the VAT revenue and the
incentive of states to improve monitoring  to ensure collection of revenue from that
sources. Even a sub-optimal a tax rate could achieve a significant contribution to
pollution reduction in many of the most po'luting sectors.
4. Policy Lessons For Brasil
The key message of the paper is that the interactive system  that characterizes the
multiple levels  of decision  makers in  Brazil's institutional  structure for  environmental
protection can be incentive-compatible, as well as financially sustainable. However,
this requires  that instruments be used and assigned appropriately across government
levels.
The  model  presented  highly  simplifies  many  of  the  issues  of  concern  to
policymakers in Brazil. 2 Hence, it  does not provide very specific recommendations such
as what the actual optimal tax rate should be if a pollution tax were to be adopted. The
model accounts however for most core institutional aspects of pollution management in
Brazil and hence leads to some suggestions for reforms in pollution management that can
result in improvements in policy implementation and benefit both the states and the
federal government. Up to now:
i.  IBAMA (Brazil's  FEPA) has generally not been very enthusiastic about
checking  how well  the  states  are performing  their Constitutional
assignment as  monitors of the environment. Furthermore, IBAMA  has  not
really relied on any systematic fine system to induce improvements in
poor performing  states. On occasions,  federal matching grants  for
states construction projects  have been  overruled but the  lack of
transparency of the current system does not allow to suggest that
this was related to the quality of states pollution control policies;
Li.  States have not been very keen on IBAMA (the  Brazilian FEPA) checking
what they are doing. They  have been using fines as the equivalent of
21.  For ingance, we  did not explicitly  model: (a) interrgional  externalities;  (b) inteffegionel  tax  competition;  (b)  optimal subsidies  for
pollution  control; and (d) repetition  of the game.27
pollution  taxes  but  not  nearly  as  much  as  they  could  have  to  maximize
revenue  or should  have to improve  the quality  of the environment.
This  reflected  their  fear  of having  firms  closing  their  doors  or the
fear  of losing  sales  tax  revenue  as a  result  of excessive  pressure  on
the firms.  They  have also  been  very unpredictable  in their  relation
with  the firms;
iii.  The firms  have  used,  very rationally,  the extreme  leniency  shown  by
the states  and the lack  of involvement  of IBAMA,  to minimize  their
efforts  to reduce  pollution.  The  most polluting  firms  have invested
when public  pressure  was strong  enough  to force  them to do so but
without monitoring  from the SEPA they are unlikely  to have much
incentive  to minimize  pollution.
To cope  with  these  facts,  the  paper  provides  two  main  policy  recommendations.  The
first  is  that the  federal  government  needs  to  keep  a closer  eye  on how firms  deal  with
the dirty industries  relative  to the clean  industries.  When states  care mostly  about
revenue,  they  will  tend  to spend  more  resources  focusing  on less  polluting  industries.
IBAMA  can  rely  on  a  combination  of  3  main instruments:  inspection  rates,  fine  levels  and
subsidies  to firms  for  abatement  or states  for  monitoring.  If fines  are  high  enough  the
federal inspection  effort required should not  be  excessive in terms of  budget
requirements.  In general,  as realistic  fine levels  are  unlikely  to lead  to full  state
compliance  with monitoring  requirements,  the net revenue from increased inspection
should  be positive.A
The second  recommendation  is an endorsement  of the pollution  tax considered  by
many states  as an instrument  to both reduce  pollution  and finance  pollution  control
policies.  The  tax  should  clearly  be a state  tax  rather  than  a federal  tax  if  the  states
have  to have  a strong  incentive  to perform  their  Constitutional  assignment. To avoid
possible  strategic  behavior  by  states  inconsistent  with  federal  objectives,  the  federal
government  should  probably  set  the  tax  rate.  The  rate  sho-ild  not  be set  too iow  because
low rates favor dirty or old industries  for which large  potential improvements  in
abatement  are  possible.  The rate  could  be a minimum  that states  could  reinforce  it if
22  isinspectionrole  could  actually  be  assigned  to  the  privatesector  and  cost  recovery  for their  services  should  be oneof the  corponent
of the  design of the fine.28
they felt it was a  way for them to compensate  for lack of resources  to ensure  the
monitoring  requirements  imposed  by the  federal  government.  Whatever  the  actual  design
of  the  tax, its  implementation  will improve  the  environment  even if the  FEPA does not
inspect the states. There may  be sunk costs required to acquire the monitoring
instruments  and to set up the infrastructure  arn these may be cofinanced  with the
federal  government.  Except  for  those  capital  costs,  the  pollution  tax  could  lead  to  self
sustained  industrial  pollution  control  as  its  revenue  potential  is  generally  sufficient
to increase  states'  net revenue  even  when losses  in VAT  revenue  are  accounted  for.  In
many of the Southern  states  such as Parana,  Sao Paulo  and Rio de  Janeiro,  pollution
taxes  are being  considered  to curb  industrial  pollution."  It is unfortunate  that  many
of the  poorer  states  are  not  considering  that instrument.  However  small  the  industrial
sector,  the pollution  tax will help.  It could  be paid by the agricultural  sector  but
also by state water companies for instance,  in many states they are responsible,
directly  or not, for  a very  large  share  of water  pollution.
In addition  tc these  two  main recommendations,  the  paper  also  makes  the  case for
subsidies  to improvements  in  the  degree  of abatement  efficiency  relied  upon  by firms  as
a  way  to reduce  the short  term  growth  costs  of pollution  control.  The paper  points  to
some of the limitation  of pollution  taxes in the "real  world" as compared  to the
economist's  world.  A  single  flat  rate  across  sectors  is  about  the  only  administratively
realistic approach to the tax. Its adjustment  through monitoring  to achieve the
effective  tax rate is essentially  impossible.  The directions  for differentiation  of
monitoring  efforts  are  however  very jlear.  As expected,  the less  efficient  the firm's
abatement  technology  and the more polluting  the  firms,  the stronger  the monitoring
effort  should  be, for  a  given  statutory  tax  rate.
23.  Misufderdandings  eabout ome of the inWtication  of pollution  taxes on state  revenue or on output levels  may  explain why in Rio de
Janeiro,  for instance,  the pollution  tax has  been proposed  various times by the SEPA  with a clear design but has never benefitted  from the
conlermntafy  reguhtlo required  for Its  Inmlementation.29
ANNEX
Thie annex provideo a formal presentation of the model described in section 2. It
reproduces the hierarchical decision making structure of Brazil's pollution  control
management.  To  simplify  the  presentation,  we  focus  on  the  vertical  behavioral
relationship between the FEPA, a representative SEPA and a representative firm.
1. The Firm's Problem
The firm has a fixed capital stock in the short-run, K, which can be used either
to produce an output or to abate pollution generated in the production process.  For
simplicity in deriving our policy implications, we assume that the firm has a well-
behaved quadratic production function, which serves as a second order approximation to
any  twice  differentiable  production  functions  at  least  in  the  equilibrium
neighborhood'.  So, we can write the firm's value-added production function as
Y - a  (K-C) 2 + P  (K-C)  + y  <  O,>O  (1)
where Y is the output level, C (O  S C S X) is the firm's investment for environmental
protection,  a, P  and  y  are technical coefficients reflecting the efficiency of the
productive capital.  Here, the inequality a <  0 ensures the concavity of the production
function,  and a  >  -2aK  is  a necessary  condition  for the  marginal  product  of  the
productive capital being positive25. Contributions from other productive factors, such
as labor and technology, are embodied in y, in addition to a and P.
The pollution intensity associated with the above production scheme is assumed to
be presented by a pollution function
P =  p(Y,  C),  p1 >  °  P2 <  0  (2)
24.  Using Cobb-Douglas  production  function  or other CES  production  functions  will generate  the identical  qualitative  results  but creates
discontinuity  in players' reactions.
25  lhe marginal  product of the productive  capital is
d(K-C)  2a(K-C)  +
A positive dY/d(K-c)  requires  that 2a(K-C)  +p  > 0 holds for all possible  values  of C.  Especially,  when the firm does not control
its pollution  at all, ie.,  C = 0, we shall have  p  > -2aK.30
where  P  is the index  for  pollution  intensity. p,  and  p2 are  partial  derivatives  of P.
with  respect  to Y and  C, respectively.  Hence,  (2)  implies  that  the  pollution  intensity
in the  environment  will increase  with  the  output  level  but  decrease  if more funds  are
spent  for  environmental  protection.  In  many  countries,  including  Brazil,  the  SEPA  cannot
measure  polluting  emissions  directly  and  hence  it  is  difficult  to  determine  the  base  for
a pollution  tax.  An  alternative  is to focus  on the pollution-generating  factors  in
production. In our  model,  the  productive  capital  K - C is the only  easily  measurable
polluting  factor.  2  With this constraint  of measurement,  we can simplify  the firm's
pollution  function  as
P  (K-  C)  - wC  > O,  0  >  0  (3)
where '  is  the  pollution  rate  of  the  productive  capital  and  w is  the  abatement  rate  for
the environment  protection  investment.  The  linear  approximation  (3)  of the  pollution
function  (2)  is acceptable  in the neighborhood  of the firm's  optimal  choice  of C. Of
course  in  practice,  the  pollution  rate  per  unit  of capital  varies  from  sector  to  sector
and  within  a sector,  it  varies  with  the  age  of  the  capital  stock.  More  recent  equilpment
is  likely  to have lower  pollution  rates."  The data required  at the firm  level  are
however generally  not readily available  and the average  pollution  intensity  of the
sector  will be used instead  in the simulations.A
2 6.  Io  pacetice,  mny SEPAs  in Brazil  are  arting to acquire  an  increasing  knowledge  of the pollution  intensity  of the capitl stock. It is not
only  derived  from  current  inspection  practices  but al5s  from the requirement  that an environmental  impact  asessment be presented  before  rmajor
new Investments  ame  authorized.
27 . Generally,  the reduction  in pollution  due to a specific  pollution  abatement  device  can be derived  from engineering  data. Denote  this rate
of  abatement by  a.  The  following relationship between so and  a,  then  holds  for  any specific combination of  K  and C:
i(K-Cd)  -Cd  =  1-a
where  Ce  is  the  narket  price of the device.  So the  abatement  rate  can  be expressed  in terms of the pollution  rate, the device abatenment  rate and
the  cost of the abatement  device,  I.e.,
2  a  alat  d  ol
28.  1b  pptoxinutiottforpollution  intensity uwedin the  imulstion is based on David Wheelers  series.31
In  more  general  terms,  equation  (3)  says  that  ln  additlon  to  the  obvious  reduction
in pollution  due to the reductlon  ln output,  reflectlng  a lower productive  capital
stock,  pollution  will  decline  as a function  of the abatement  technology  adopted.  Take
the case  of water  pollution  due to heavy  metals  for  instance.  The share  of  capital  C
would  represent  a  treatment  station  that  would  result  in  a  reduction  in  pollution  levels
per  unit  of capital  used in  production.  ReductLon  of pollution  will however  vary  with
technology.  An anaeroblc  filter  would only achLeve a 50% reduction  whlle chemical
treatment  would  achieve  a  90%  reduction.
From  (3), we  know that to  completely  eliminate the  pollution effect of
production,  the firm has to invest  C - #K/l(c+4),  which serves  as a  ceiling  level  of
investment  for  pollution  control. In  other  words,  the  ratio  of capital  stock  allocated
for  environmental  protectlon  over  the  total  capital  stock  has  to satisfy  the following
constraint,
0 S  C  S  1  (4)
K  +
This  means that  a  "dirty" Lndustry  with a  low abatement efficiency  will have a
relatively  high  ceiling  level  for  environmental  protection  investment.
Now  consider  the  determinants  of  the  firm's  profits.  Flrm  profits  are  affected  by
two taxes.  The first Ls a state value-added  tax at rate ty.  The  second is a new
pollution  tax  that  an increasing  number  of states  are  trylng  to introduce.  Assume  it  is
based  on emissions  at rate tp  and  that it can  only be levied  if the 8EPA checks  the
envlronmental  quality.  In thls  case,  the  firm's  proflt  function  can be  written  as
s(  C;  K)  (  (1  - ty)  Y  - rk  - 0 tpP  (
_  (1-tY)ta(K-C) 2+P(K-C)+y1  -rK-0tp[*(  K-C)-(  C]
where  O is the probability  that the SEPA monitor.  a specLfic  firm ln the sector.  In
practlce,  sLnce  this Ls a short  term  model,  once a firm  has  been inspected,  the SEPA
knows  what proportion  of the capital  stock  is allocated  to pollution  control  and can
collect  the pollution  tax  until  the firm  can  prove  that it has  changed  Lts  C. Some  of
the  information  could  be  collected  in  the  process  of  the  environmental  impact  assessment
(EIA).  The  EIA,  when  implemented  correctly,  provides  a  sLgnificant  volume  of  data  on  the
nature  and  intensity  of  the  polluting  activity  of  a firm.  This  informatlon  could  be--and32
is,  for  some sectors and in some states in Brazil-- at the core of the  information
available to decide which firms to monitor. If all the firms are checked in a year or
if all firms need to go through an EIA, the probability is 1. Another interpretation
could be that a probability of 1 means that the sector is monitored once a week--but
never on the same day. Any reduction in the frequency of visits to the firm cuts the
probability. For any given capital stock  K, r is  the market-determined rent for  capital
and rK is a fixed cost the firm has to pay to hold K.  In  the short-run, we assume that
r and K are both stable with respect to the firm's decision on how much to spend to
abate the pollution.  In other words, the firm can  respond to the SEPA's policy faster
than the capital stock and rent can change.
For any given 0  and K, we can derive the first order condition for the firm's
profit maximization problem, where the first derivative of  r(C;K)  with respect to C is
di(C;K)  =  -(l  - [)  22a(K-  C) +  p]  +  (  + w)  (6)
dC 
The second order condition for maximization
d 2 (C;)  = 2a(1  - ty) <  0  (7)
dC2
is satisfied for all choices of C, since a <  0 and t.  <  1.  Therefore, the firm's profit
is maximized when its selection of C satisfies the following equation
(1-ty)  [2&  (K  - C) + PI =  Otp(*  + )  (8)
The intuition behind  (8) is that the firm chooses C to balance its marginal gain of
investing for  environmental protection and its  marginal cost  of doing so.  At the  margin
where the optimal C  is set,  one dollar investment in controlling pollution will save the
firm pollution tax by Otp(o+w)  while cost the firm (l-tY)[2a(K-C)+6I]  in terms of after-
tax sales revenue.  If the pollution tax is zero, equation (6) and the assumption of
concavity of the  production  function  shows that  the  firm will maximize  profits by
ignoring pollution control altogether (C=O).33
Policy Implication It
If the  marginal  cost  of pollution  abatement,  as presented  on the  left  hand aide
of (8),  is greater  than  the  marginal  benefit  of abating  pollution,  as presented  on the
right hand side of (8), then the firm will reduce its investment  for pollution control.
Especially, when et,(O+w)  <  (F-tyj(2aK+p),  the firm will feel it rational to completely
ignore its environmental  responsibility.
Policy implication 2
Given the  firm's  technical  parameters,  a, ,  '  and  (,  the  effectiveness  of tho
SEPA's  environmental  policy  is  determined  by  the  effective  pollution  tax  rate  Ot" Instead
of its nominal  pollution tax rate tp.  A low Inspection  rate discounts the firm's
liability  on pollution  tax.
With  the  assumption  that'  Otp(,(+w)  2  (1-ty)(2aK+fJ),  we  can  solve  the  firm's
optimal  selection of C,  from equation  (8), as  a  function of  all  of  its technical
parameters and policy parameters, especially, as a best-reply function to the  SEPA's
monitoring frequency i.e.,
C(o) - K  +  t  O  e(*+  t ) > 0  (9) 2&  2a  (1-ty)
and the consequent allocation for the productive capital is then
K - C(e)  - '  2  p  - etp(*+.)J  0O  (10) 2[  1-ti,.
and the consequent pollution intensity level will be
29.  Otherwise,  C = 0  is the firm's bec choice.34
Po)  =EK  - c()  ]  - w c(O)
t2*+  0)2  (1 = ~  2  +  + ) +  (OK+  )  (1
2ca  2tx(l  - ty)-
The above  three equations,  expressing  the firms'  optimal behavior  in capital
allocation  and pollution  control  as parametric  functions  of the  SEPAs'  environmental
policy,  can  be very useful  for  the  SEPAs  to set levels  of their  policy  instruments.
But  what  happens  to  the  effective  tax  rate  if  a SEPA  has  a  maximum  tolerance  level  for
pollution.  It  may  be very  patient  and  try  to  minimize  its  efforts  to contro'l  pollution
up  to that  level.  Once  that  level  is  reached,  how  should  the  SEPA  set  the  statutory  tax
rate  and  the  monitoring  effort?  This is addressed  next.
Policy  Implication  3
If  the  SEPA  has  a  maximum  pollution  tolerance  level,  denoted  by  Pe,  and  a positive
expected  (planned)  monitoring  rate  E(O)  >  0,  then  the  SEPA  will  set  a  pollution  tax  rate
at least  as high  as the  "minimum  required  pollution  tax  rate",  which  is presented  as
tp,  =  (  +1  t y  [w(2aK+P)  +  P*  + 2UP;]  (12)
This  lower  bound  for  the  pollution  tax  rate  guarantees  that
(1  - ty)  (2c&K. +P)  < tp,E(O)  (*  + c)  (13)
This  policy  implication  underline.  another  issue.  If  the  FEPA  sets  a  uniform  pollution
tax rate,  then the SEPA will choose  a minimum  monitoring  rate  G, to ensure  that the
pollution  level  does not  exceed  the ceiling  pollution  tolerance  level.  Here,
e  =  Lt.  ..1(2aK+p)+p,+2aP4']  (14)
Obviously,  9.  differs  with  the firms'  production  technology  (as  reflected  by a and ),
pollution  intensity  and  abatement  efficiency.35
Policy  implication 4
Vith a positive nominal pollution tax  rate, namely tp  >  0, the  more frequently the
SEPA inspects the firm's  polluting  behaviors, the more the firm will allocate to
pollution control, as its effective tax rate on pollution increases.
This is true theoretically since from (9)  we have:
dC(O)  - tp(*  + @)  >0  (15)
In other words, if the SEPA increases its monitoring frequency, the firm will
respond by investing more funds for environmental protection.
Policy Implication 5
With a  positive inspection  rate,  namely, 0  > 0, raising  either the value-added tax
rate  t 7 or the  pollution  tax  rate t,  will stimulate  the  firm to reduce  pollution.
This can be verified from adjusting ty  and tp  in (9).  In other words, raising tr
reduces the marginal cost of pollution control, while raising tp  increases the firm's
marginal benefit of  spending money  for environment protection.  In the model, both
prompt the  firm to  increase investment  in abatement. This  in turn will  lead to a
reduction in pollution. This pollution reduction stems from the switch of capital from
production to abatement. In practice, production may also be cut by reducing capacity
utilization rather than by investing  more ln abatement. Pollution is cut either way but
the state revenue effect will be quite different if the firm's strategy is to reduce
utilization rather than increasing abatement. The model does not allow to assess the
relative importance of this revenue effect.
Policy Implication 6
If  the  SEPA  can  manage  to  increase  the  efficiency  of  abatement  (namely  to  Increase
w),  say  by subsidizing  research  projects  on environmental  protection  or  by subsidizing
the  purchase  of  more efficient  abatement  technology  by firms,  then the  firm  will have
more incentive  to  Invest  in  pollution  control.36
Improving efficiency  of pollution control investment  i  desirable since it
increases  the marginal  benefit  while  keeps  the marginal  cost constant.  This makes  a
strong  case for subsidies as an instrument for pollution control. within the framework
develop  here, however, it is clear that subsidies  will only work if the firms  are
subject to a non-trivial  effective tax rate. Furthermore  the  specific  design or
targeting  of the  subsidy  is crucial  determinant  of its  success.0
Policy  Implication  7
Since  Increasing  t,, tp,  °  and w  has the same  qualitative impact on the firm's
optimal  behavior,  the  SEPA  can  uset (i)  tax  rates,  (iI)  the  inspection  frequency  and
(i1i)  research  subsidies  as  substitutes  to induce the  firm to cut the pollution  it
generatoa--assuming  that  the  effective  tax  rate  is above  the  minimum  required  rate.
To  get insightful  policy  discussLons,  we concentrate  on interior  solutions  of  the
firm's  optimization  problem  where  0  < C  < K.  With  C selected  within  these  limits,  the
firm's  output  level  can be regarded  as a  best-response  correspondence  to the SEPA's
policy mix: O -6  Y(O). And we know
dY(ID)  dY  {_dC(6)\  tp(*++O)  J2  < o  1s
dO  bd[K-C(O).  I (_  a  2aL  1-ty
This  confirms  that  an increase  in  the  monitoring  frequency  (or  the  pollution  tax
rate)  will  lead  to  a lower  output  level,  since  more  capital  is  reallocated  for  pollution
control. Consequently,  the  pollution  intensity  will decline,  i.e.,
dP(O)  d[K-C(O)I  _  w  dC(S)= t2p(*  2 <  (17)
Changes  in  the  expected  pollution  tax  paid  by the  firm  to  the SEPA  can  be either
positive  or  negatlve,  depending  on  which  effect  dominates,  namely,
d[t'  -O()  =  t P(0)  +  tp  0dP()  (18)
30.  lb hi act  dealt  withbe,  but forf allr  diuatuon,  eEskeland  and  iimenez,  g cit_37
The first term in (18) is  the (positive)  marginal  gain due to the increased
monitoring  frequency,  while  the  second  term is  the (negative)  marginal  loss  due  to the
shrunk  pollution  tax basis.  However,  if we look  at the  elasticity  of pollution  tax
revenue  with respect  to a  marginal  increase  of the  monitoring  rate,  we have
t  d[  t  0P(o)  I  r,  dP(0)  1
tp a P (a  ltp(u)  d  tO  i  (19)
~l+  8  dP  (0)
P(O)  d
Therefore,  the  elasticity  of pollution  tax revenue  is positively  correlated  with the
elasticity  of pollution  level with respect  to the change  of the SEPA's monitoring
frequency.  More specifically,  the absolute  values  of the  two  elasticities  sum  to l.
2. The  SEPA's  Problem
Let  F denote  the  lump-sum  penalty  imposed  by the  FEPA  upon  the  SEPA if the  FEPA
discovers  that  the  SEPA does  not  monitor  the firm's  performance  on pollution  control.
In  practice,  the  FEPA  could  for  instance  go  to a river  in a highly  polluted  region  and
check  water  quality.  If  pollution  is  in  excess  of  federal  standards,  the  SEPA  is fined,
irrespective  of  the  source.  The  FEPA  should  not  have  to  worry  about  the  specific  sources
of pollution,  ambient  quality  control  should  be sufficient.
Let q  (0<t)<1)  denote the probability  that the EEPA audits the SEPA.  The
probability  would be 1 if for instance  the FEPA checks,  the water once a week. Any
reduction  in the frequency  reduces  the probability.  Then the SEPA's  expected  net tax
revenue  can  be  written  as
R(0:  q)  =  tyY(O)  +  tp0P(O)  - OM  - (1-f)jF  (20)
where  M is  the  monitoring  cost  of the  SEPA.  Equation  (20)  reflects  the fact  that  total
revenue  from  the VAT and  the pollution  tax need to be adjusted  for  SEPA's  monitoring
costs  and  for fines  paid by the states  for  violation  of FEPA's  directives. Since  the
SEPA acts as the Stackelberg  leader  in its  relationship  with the firm,  Y, P and  C In
(20)  are  functions  of  0.  For  any  given  v  and  the  firm's  responses,  the  SEPA  selects  its
monitoring frequency  to maximize its expected  net tax revenue.  Take  the first
derivative  of the  SEPA's  objective  function,  we have38
dR(O;v1)  dY(8)  + t  P()  tdP(8)  - M  +  4F  (21)
The  second  derivative  of  R(O9;)  with  respect  to  B is
d2R(8;i)  trf  te(*+W)  1+  < 
dO2  2al  1-ty  +  (I)  -(ty)
So,  the  second  order  condition  is  satisfied  for  all  feasible  values  of  h.  &ence,
the  SEPA's  optimal  choice  of 8 is  determined  from  the following  equation
m  - e_tr,(*+w) 2+  _2_  (___)_)  =  F  + tppP(0)  (23)
which  equalizes  the  SEPA's  marginal  cost  and  marginal  benefit  of Inspecting  the  firm's
polluting  behaviors. Here,  the  SEPA's  marginal  cost  is  the  left  hand  side  of (23).  The
marginal  benefit  is  the  right  hand  side.  It is  easy  to  verify  from (11)  and (23)  that
the SEPA's marginal cost of monitoring  is (linearly)  increasing  with 6 while its
marginal  benefit  is (linearly)  decreasing  with  9.
Substitute  (11)  into (23),  we can  get:
[  (  2a  tw@K+ p  PtE(+  -4F+M)(1-ty)2)  (24)
o  - minfmax  2a  o
(2-ty)  tP(2  +  *)2
The  max-operator  in  the inner  bracket  rules  out  possible  negative  solutions.  The
outside  min-operator  excludes  any solution  with  6 being  greater  than  100%. The  SEPA's
optimal  choice  of 9 can  be  in  three  possible  cases,  as  graphed  in Figure  4.  In case
(i),  the SEPA's  marginal  cost  of  monit  sring  is larger  than its  corresponding  marginal
benefit  at 9 - 0.  This  is equivalent  to  stating  that
t)F  < M +  t  i  K  +  p ti(  +  w)  (25)39
So, the SEPA will rationally  choose "not to monitor" the  firm's pollution
behavior. This case can  be true  when (a)  the SEPA'o  monitorlng  cost is  too high, (b)
the  penalty  paid  to the  FEPA  is  not  significant,  or (c)  the  FEPA's  environmental  policy
is  heavily  discounted  by its  low  inspection  rate. On the  other  hand  as in  case (iii),
the  SEPA's  marginal  cost  of  monitoring  is  relatively  low  even  at  B - 1. Hence,  the  SEPA
will  always  feel  it  beneficial  to conduct  an inspection  to push the  firm  to invest  for
pollution  control.
When  the solution  to the  SEPA's  maximization  problem  is  interior  in (0,1),  then
we have
'd9, -2_  (26) _I  _I  F> 
dq  2-tyk  tD(*+b)) 
and
df . _:2~  a  1lt  2  (27)
dF  2-tytp(,  +w)  °
Hence,  we have  the following  policy  implications.
Policy  Implication  8
An Increase in the penalty level F or in the inspection  rate 7j  will  raise the
SEPA's incentive to comply  with the environmental law by increasing Its own monitoring
frequency, thus reduce the pollution  intensity  in the environment.
This is follows  from  equation  (17)  and (26):
dP  dP  dO  <0  -ty  C  (2B)
l  dl  tp(2-ty)
In  fact,  a bigger  F implies  a larger  marginal  benefit  for  the  SEPA  to  monitor  the
firm's  pollution  behavior.40
Policy Implication 9
A reduction  in the  SEPA's  monitoring  cost,  X, will  stimulate  the  SEPA  to  monitor
more frequently. This suggests that well targetted federal subsidies should be
considered  as a  possible  instrument  to  reduce  pollution.
This  can  be  verified  by  taking  the  first  order  condition  of  the  SEPA's
optimization problem as an implicit function, and
Ado  26  f  l-tz  7 <  o  (29)
dM  2-tyt  tp(*+(J))
This policy  implication suggest that federal subsidies in the form of matching
grants for instance would contribute to an improved monitoring performance if it were
allocating to  cost reducing investments  by firms.  Figure 5  above graphically illustrates
these two policy implications.
Policy Implication 10
If  the  FEPA  has  a  maximum  standard  for  the  pollution  intensity  in  the  environment,
then it can set  a set  of appropriate penalty level and inspection  rate such that its
target  on environment  protection  can  be achieved  through  behavior  adjustments  of the
SEPA  and the  pollution-generating  firm.
This  implication can be understood by  checking backward through  the players'
reaction chain.  From (11),  we know that the pollution intensity, P, is  determined once
the firm  made its portfolio decision on how  much to invest for  pollution control, which
in  turn is a  response of the SEPA's  tax-monitoring policy.  Meanwhile, from (24),  we see
that the SEPA's optimal selection of monitoring frequency is a response function of the
FEPA's policy mix.  Therefore, the pollution intensity level P is a composite response
function of F and '.  For any given ceiling standard for pollution intensity, say PO,
the FEPA can figure out a  floor requirement for the SEPA's monitoring rate, denoted by
Of.  Then,  with other  technical and policy parameters  pre-determined, the FEPA can
calculate a combination of a  and F such that the SEPA's choice of 0 is  at  least  as  high
as Of.  In this manner, the pollution intensity in the environment can be controlled
under the pre-set target level P. This policy-making procedure is incentive compatible.41
To ensure that the regional authority fully comply  with  the  environmental  law
(i.e.,  0  - 1), the FEPA has to qet an effective penalty level satisfying the following
condition
Pt,  4 +  ()  _2_-  ___2______ qF  2 M +  tp w  K  +  X)  tp  +  (2-  to*  (30)
2a  ~~2&(1  -t 7)  2
Inequality (30)  provides a guideline for the FEPA to set a penalty level for any given
expected (planned) inspection rate.
3.  The  FEPA's  Problem
A growth-oriented FEPA likes the firm's total output but dislikes the pollution
it generates.  This preference, commonly represented as a social welfare function, can
be written as a simple objective function of the FEPA, i.e.,
U(Y,P)  =  Y - Ap(Y,C)+  [ (1  - 0)F  - m  (31)
where m is the FEPA's inspection cost and x  is the FEPA's relative disutility of the
pollution, which converts the FEPA's dislike of pollution in terms comparable with GNP
figures.  The value of X is determined by the society's pressure or some other socio-
economic factors.  From (31), we can see that
dP = dY  (32)
dPLU
i.e., X  is the FEPA's marginal substitution rate between output and pollution, which
keeps the FEPA's utility level constant. The FEPA's influence on the firm is indirect
through the SEPA.  As the up-most Stackelberg leader in  the game, the FEPA knows how the
SEPA  would respond to its  own  policy selection.  Substltute  the SEPA's response function
into the FEPA's utility function, we can write the FEPA'o objective function as
u =  U(()  =  YEB(q)] - lP[8(q)]  +  ([11-O(q)  IF - m(  (33)42
Take  the first  derivative  of u, we get
du  ,,,dYO  +  d  -)F-md  - PFdB  - dP  dB
_!EL  di1  (34) d,q  dO dq 
From (15),  (16)  and (17),  we obtain
d2 00
d 2 y  1  tp (+0)  12 < o  (35)
dO 2 =2  [  l-t  J
d2P(e)  .o
d2 0
So,  the second  order  condition  for  the  FEPA's  maximization  problem  iu satisfied
for  all  ,  in [0,1],  since
d2u  _d2Y  _d2P  dO2+  a  I dY  1_  F - I  dP  d2  - 2F A)
dqX 2 ~  ,  dO2 d02  dq  r  e  e  2  dO  2  dil  (36)
=  -2F-du  + d2 (dOyld2  ) < O
The FEPA selects its best monitoring  policy  by solving j  from the following
equation
MC  - m  ~ iy  dV  +  qqdQ  F dl_o(q)lF  _  l  ddaP  dil  MB  (37)
Treat  (37)  as  an  im.plicit  function  rel.S.ng  policy  parameters  of  both  the  FEPA  and
the  SEPA,  we have
d2u  dP  dlO
!2=  - d  l  d).  __  _  __  _  >0  (38)
ax  d2u  -2F d+  d2Y  Cia
du 2 dq  d 2 dq43
Policy  Implication  11
The  more  the  FEPA dislikes  pollution,  the  more  frequently  the  FEPA  will  monitor
the  SEPA's  performance.  Consequently,  the  pollution  intensity  level  in the  environment
will  be  reduced.
This  can  be  seen  from
dAP _ dP  d  <°  (39)
dl  dO dqdA
Policy  Implication  12
Reducing  the  FEPA's  inspection  cost will contribute  to alleviate  environmental
pollution.
This  follows  from:
d
2 u
cm,  _E  .dd  1  < 0  (40)
dm  d2u  ,d  d2Y d  0(42
dq2  dy  2d2
and
dP  _  dP  dO A  > 0  (41)
dm  drat)  am44
APPZXDI1  Data Issues
A.1.  Data scarcity  heavily  confines  the scope  znd quality  of empirical  tests  of our
theoretical  modelling.  Information  on pollution intensity  and its relevant  economic
statistLis  are  hardly  available  in  most developlng  countries. Even  though  we can  get
some data from dlfferent sources,  it is difficult to evaluate  their reliabilLty.
Sometlmes  they are simply  lncomparable. Therefore,  cautions  must be taken when we
interpret  our  empirical  results.  Brazil's  persisting  hyperinflation  further  complicates
our data  mining.
A.2.  To conduct  numerical  policy  simulations,  we need two types of data. The first
reflects  the  economy's  statistLcal  characteristics,  generally  influenced  by  government
policLes  but  not  directly  controlled  by  the  government.  These  include  the  parameters  in
the firm's  production  function.  The second  type of data are the policy instruments.
ELther  the federal  or the state governments  can set them. These include  tax rates,
monitoring  levels  and  penalty  levels.  They  can  be  used  to perform  sensitivity  analysis.
The interactions  between  these  two  types  of data  provlde  the basis  for  our  simulation
work.
A.3.  More specifically,  the  characterization  of  the  varlables  and  data  requirements  is
as follows:
Exogenous  Variables
K:  the  total  sectoral  capital  stock
Yt  the value-added  output  level
Ps  the  pollution intensity index, which ls the total toxic release into the
onvironment
Technical  Parameters
a, 0  and  'y:  the efficLency  index  of the  productlve  capital
At  the  pollution  rate  of  the  productive  capital
Ws  the  abatement  rate  of the  investment  for  pollution  control
Policy  Parameters:
ty:  the value-added  tax rate
tps  the  pollution  tax  rate
):  the inspectLon  cost  of the SEPA
mt  the inspection  cost  of the FEPA
F:  the  penalty  the SEPA pays  to  the  FEPA  lf the  SEPA is dLscovered  "cheating"
x  the coeffLcient  for  the  FIPA's  relative  disutillity  of the pollution
Xndogenous  Variables:
C:  the flrm's  optimal  choice  of investment  for  pollution  control,
r:  the  value-added  output  when lnvestment  for  pollutlon  control  is allocated,
r:  pollution  intensity  the firm  generates  when investment  for  pollutlon  control  is
allocated,
RW  the SEPA's  tax revenue  at equilibrium
6:  the inspectLon  frequency  for  the  SEPA
17s  the  inspection  frequency  for  the  FEPA
uo  the  social  welfare  functlon  at  equilibrium45
A.4  Estimation  of quadratic  production  functions
This section  provides  rough  estimates  of sectoral  production  functions  for  two
industrial  sectors  in  Brazil. One  of them  is a "dirty  industry"  according  the  Wheeler
classification,  the  other  is  a  mildly  polluting  or  toxic  sector. The first  is  printing
and  publishing,  the  second  is food.
lor  each  sector,  from  the  Brazilian  Statistical  Office  publication  on historical
series,  IBGE,  we have  11  observations  on  the  sectoral  investment,  value-added  and  gross
output  from  1970  to 1980.  From in the  1970  and 1980  input-output  matrix,  we extracted
the  capital  stock.  Relying  on  the  investment  series  and  deriving  an  average  depreciation
by comparing  the 1970 and 1980 capital stocks,  we reconstructed  the annual  capital
stock.  All  variable  are  expressed  in  1987  dollars.  A  quadratic  production  function  with
three  parameters  is  estimated  for  each sector  at  degree  of freedom  8.  The  results  of
OLS estimation  are  presented  below. The figures  in the  brackets  are the  t statistics
for  the  estimated  parameters.
(a)  Food
Y= - 0.00000017  (K-C) 2 +  2.9788 (K-C)  - 6396533  R 2 =  0.953
(-2.3)  (3.4)  (-2.6)
(b)  Printing  and  Publishing
Y= - 0.0000033 (K-C) 2 + 6.8019(K-C) - 1913619  A 2 =  0.86
(3.3)  (3.8)  (15.4)
At 90% significance  level,  the t-statistic  with 8 degree  of freedom  for all
estimated  parameters  are  required  to be  greater  than  2.2  to accept  the  hypothesis  that
the parameters  are significantly  different  from zero. These unconstrained  estimates
satisfy  our a  priori  parameters  requirements.46
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